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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD D. RAINFORD 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. RYTTING AND 
SUZANNE H. RYTTING 
Defendants and Appellants 
Case No. 
11276 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for the purchase price of stock, 
which contract of purchase was unconditionally guar-
anteed by the defendants. Payments were not made in 
accordance with the contract. This suit was commenced 
against the defendants, the unconditional guarantors. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Smmnary Judgment was granted in favor of plain-
tiff and against the defendants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks the court to affirm the Summary 
·fnclgment of the 'l1rial Court. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FAcrrs 
Plaintiff does not agTP(' ·with the statement of fad 
of defendants because it is not eomplde, nor rntire!)· 
accurate, and makes statement:::; of fact which are not 
contained in the record as if they ,,-ere. Therefore, r>lain-
tiff and respondent present the follo\ving: 
The defendants operated a ladies dress shop in Yaki-
ma, \Vashington known as rrhe Carriage Homw, lne., 
a corporation. The store was operated by Mr. and Mrs. 
Rytting and plaintiff was an inactive officer and stoC'k-
holder (R. 33). The plaintiff had purchased 25 shares 
of stock in the corporation. The defendants at all times 
managed and operated the store and defendants became 
desirous of purchasing plaintiff's stock so the defendants 
and plaintiff entered into a contract, Exhibit "A" a copy 
of \vhich is at the end of this Brief, the subject matter 
of this lawsuit, by the terms of which The Carriage 
House, Inc. would purchase the 25 shares of stock nf 
the plaintiff. That said agreement was guaranteed by 
the defendants personally, which guarantee is as follows: 
"Undersigned hereby personally guarantee 
full payment and performance of the above con-
ditional sales contract by The Carriage House, 
Inc." 
/s/ \Villiam R. Ryttiug 
/s/ Suzanne IL Rytting 
By the terms of the agreement the stock was to be pai<l 
for at the rate of $100.00 per month, commencing on tlw 
10th day of August, 1966 together \vith G% intNest. 
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That the eontrad providPd that to secure the obli-
i.;ation the vtindor should retain the title and possession 
('f said stock, but that the dPfrndants should have all 
tl1e rights to tl1P said stock including the right to vote 
~aid stoek and receive dividends thl•refrom, stock only 
to lH' l1eld as security. None of the assets of the corpora-
tion \rere held as security. 
Paragraph 7 specifically proyides that the contract 
eontained the entire agreeme>nt between the parties. 
That after the purchase of the stock from plaintiff, 
defendants Ryttings, disposed of all of the inventory and 
merchandise by sale and also disposed of all of the store 
fixtures, and were to take the corporate structures to 
Ptah (R. 23, 33). Plaintiff received no fixtures or ac-
eounts receivable (R. 32, 34). 
Defendants answered that the contract was illegal, 
\'oid or voidable and no consideration. (R. 16) At no 
place in their answer did they say that the plaintiff got 
('itlwr fix tu res or accounts receivable or plead payment. 
m. 5) 
In no affidavit did the defendants unequivocally state 
that the plaintiff got any equipment or collected any 
llloney. Defendants in the answer to the interrogatories 
1n1·rely say that defendants CLAIM plaintiff did. (R. 16) 
In the Affidavit of John S. Moore, (R. 23) it states 
t]ip R~rttings took the books to Utah, and this has not been 
il1·nit'd by defendants. 
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Defendants were the O}JC'l'ators of the busi1w~s at 
thr time the contract was entere>cl into. That if said (·or-
poration liabilities Pxceecled its assets and was vah1Plt>~~ 
on May 27, 19GG, the date oi' tlw contract, such iufonua-
tion was known to the deft~mlants herein, lrnt unknown to 
plaintiff. (R. 33, 3±) 
That the defendants made all of the decisions a~ 
officers and directors and stockholders and said corpora-
tion pertaining to its liquidations and moving to Utah 
and sale of stock. ( R. 33) 
The contract is clear that Mr. Rainford was to haYP 
nothing further to do with the company. Rainford hnd 
no right to vote the stock. The stock was being voted by 
the Ryttings. It is very clear in the contract that all of 
the corporation authority "-as to be vested in the Rytting~ 
after the contract was entered into. 
The contract provides for the payment of monPy 
only. Nothing "-as said about fopudating accounts re-
ceivable or sale of air conditioner in the contract. 
Defendants in their Brief say the understanding that 
the proceeds of sale and mom'y from the accounts rect'iY-
able to be paid to plaintiff was arrived at prior to and 
f'xisted contemporaneous with the execution of the agrt'\'-
ment. 
That defendants were the actin' operators of tht' 
husiness and kne'v the financial condition of the corpora-
tion and knew whether its liabilities could be paid wl1t'll 
they Pntered into the contract, and they contracted in till· 
light of this knowledge. 
4 
ANS\VERING DEF'EKDANT'S ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED. 
Plaintiff in his Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
L!) statPs that there is no genuine is8ue a8 to any ma-
tPrial fad8, and that plaintiff i8 entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law complying with Rule 5G ( c). This is the 
rnle of law which is set out in 3 cases cited on page 5 of 
the defendants' Brief, which rule plaintiff has pleaded 
and contends he has complied with. 
'rhis court is constantly deciding cases involving 
~im1mar? judgments. Rule 56 has numerous cases cited 
in the 1967 pocket supplement. Plaintiffs attorney has 
C'onnted 51 cases cited under Rule 5G in Shepards Utah 
Citations of June 1968. Plaintiff thinks that the judges 
of this court have their ideas about summary judgment 
and therefore, will only make comment on the three cases 
cited by the defendants, and cites one of the last cases on 
Summary Judgment decided by this court on January 
27, 1968, which we hereinafter discuss. 
In the B1lllock vs. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc. 
11 l7t. 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559, this court holds that plaintiff 
\i·u..; entitled to summary judgment. In the Bullock case 
plaintiff and def Pndant had entered into a written con-
tract, no provision in the contract for the duration of 
th11 employment and the court holds that where there is 
no 11rovision in the contract it may be terminated by 
1·ith<T party at any time. The court enforced the agree-
111Pnt it wouldn't let a party vary the terms of the written 
agreement. 
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Plaintiff is objecting in this case to the defendanb' 
trying to vary the terms of the wri ttl>n agreement b)· 
oral evid<>ncc contending it conld Pstahlish a diffC'rent con-
tract on facts known ·when the contract ·was entered into. 
In the case of Frederick J.llay & Company 'i·s. TT'. 
Prescott Dwm and Tracy Collins Trust Company, 13 
U.2d 40, 3GS P.2d 266. The court sustains the Sum1nar)· 
Judgment because of the fact that the plaintiff had not 
proved that he complied with the terms of the contract 
fr1 that they had secured a purchaser of Keith O'Brien. 
In the instant case the contract provides that the 
stock is to be paid for in money and defendants are trying 
to vary the terms by saying it should be paid for from 
the proceeds of the air conditioner and accounts receir-
able. We submit that as a matter of law, this cannot be 
done. 
The case of Smnncr Hat ch ct al v. Sugar house Fi-
11ance Company found at 434 P.2d 758, 20 U.2d 15G, 
the court held in that case that Summary Judgment 
should not have been granted because there was a qnes-
tion of fact as to the reasonableness of attorney fees and 
Judge Ellett in his opinion set out that the question of 
attorney fees between attorney and client should be tried 
because the relationship of the public and the attorneys 
are concerned. There was a tiuestion of fact in that case 
as to what was a reasonable attorney fee. It is not anal-
oo·ous to the case at bar in which there is no factual 
b 
situation but merelv the enforcement of a contract and ' . 
not allowing it to be varied by oral evidence. 
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The case mentioned abow~ to bP discussed is the case 
iii' Olien 11. Prc,..,ton 1:. Grnrgc J>. Lamb, 43G P.2d 1021, 
~() U.2d 2GO, and WP think that ht'ad note 2 is very appli-
eable to our casP, and we quote from the SPcond headnote 
as follows: 
"2. Judgment, key 185.1 (1) 
To be of effective use in determination of mo-
tion for summary judt,11nent, affidavit must set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evi-
dence. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 56 ( e) ." 
\Ve contend that in this case that any evidence of the 
f'ontract to take the air conditioner or the accounts receiv-
able would be varying the terms of the written contract 
and \rnuld come clearly under the above quotation. 
POINT II 
THE SALE OF THE STOCK WAS NOT VOID BUT AN 
ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT AND AN ABSOLUTE GUAR-
ANTEE CAN BE ENFORCED EVEN THOUGH ORIGINAL 
OBLIGATION IS INVALID. 
DPfendants in their Brief say that the conditional 
'alPs agreement was and is illegal, and thus is void and 
unenforceable, claiming that The Carriage House, Inc. 
eonld not buy its own stock. 
Defendants cite the case of Schwab v. Getty, 145 
l\'a1-1h. GG, 258 Pac. 1035, 54 A.L.R. 1382. We point out 
to the Court that the 8chwab case was decided in 1927, 
and relates to an old statut<> which absolutely prohibited 
a eorporation from dealing in its own stock. Sub-para-
~raph (l) of RG\V 23.01.120 was passed in 1933. Sub-
7 
paragraph (2), which is the one qnoted on page 8 of 
appellant's brief was passed in 1947, Chapter 195, § l, 
Laws of 1947. 
That under the business corporation act of -Washing-
ton, as it existed prior to J nly 19G7, a corporation nncll·r 
Revist•d Code of vVashington 23.01.120, 
"shall have the power to purchase, hold, sell and 
transfer shares of its own capital stock; provided, 
that no such corporation shall use its funds or 
property for the purchase of its own shares of 
capital stock when such use would cause any im-
pairment of the capital stock of the corporation.'' 
'I'his latter provision has been interpreted in Jackson r. 
Cologrossi, 50 v\Tn. 2d 572, 313 P.2d G97, to the end that 
repurchase is limited to cases where such repurchase will 
not diminish the corporation's ability to pay its debt~, 
or lessen the security of its creditors. In the instant case, 
where the corporation was disposing of all of its physical 
assets in the State of Vv ashington with the intention of 
going to Utah to engage in business, the agreement to 
purchase, when executed, did not in any way diminish 
the corporation's ability to pay its debts or lessen the 
security of its creditors. 
In the Jackson v. Cologrossi supra the corporation 
went into bankruptcy and its trustee brought a suit where 
assets of the corporation have been used to repay the 
purchase of stock. The instant case is not a suit by the 
corporation, nor a suit by any creditor of the corporation 
to recover assets to pay their claims. This defense i~ 
being used that the entering into the contract was illegal. 
8 
Thl' PntPring into tlw contract was not illegal. It was 
::;omething which the corporation could contract to do 
providing it would not affect their creditors. No evidence 
tliat any creditor has not been paid. 
'l1he Jackson v. Cologrossi case is not a case like the 
one at bar, where the sole owners of the corporation, the 
d('fendants, purchased the stock of the other remaining 
stockholder in the corporation. The creditors are in no 
lllanner affected. This defense would not be available to 
the managers or owners of the corporation, but merely 
by the creditors. 
Admittedly, the Jackson case says what the appel-
lants quote. However, the important aspects of that case 
is that the trial court found there was no earned surplus 
with which to pay. The transaction was treated as though 
a cash payment had been made, and as of that date the 
corporation was unable to pay its debts in the usual course 
of business and was rendered still further insolvent by 
the re-purchase payment. The importance of this point 
lwcomes more clear if the Court will look at Burk v. Co-
r11Jerative Finance Corporation, 62 Wn. 2d 740, 384 P.2d 
1)18. This case involved the validity of a stock repurchase 
agreement by a cooperative, and the court held that 
RGW 23.01.120 did relate to cooperatives as well as gen-
rral corporations. In that particular case, the Court cited 
with approval In re West Waterway Lumber Co., 59 
\rn. 2d 310, 367 P.2d 807, and although this is not quoted 
in the Burke case, the Court in the \Vest \Vaterway case 
(li<i say: 
9 
''Until the enactmtmt of \Vhat is now RC\r 
23.01.120 (2) in l!J-17, corporntiom; eonld not. n-
purchase shares of thPir own stock." 
rrhe Hnrk decision, aftn refrrring to the applieahil-
it>· of the statute, tlwn sets forth the rnh~ that the applica-
tion d<•pt>nds on the solvenc~· of the corporation when tlt(• 
not<~ ht-came due, not wlwn it was issued, and later near 
the t>nd of tht- decision, the Court discusses tlw primary 
point, which w<~ believe of consequence, \vhcn, in discuss-
ing whether some of the obligation might not be collect-
able the Court says: 
"This proration is justifiable because as prev-
iously discussed the re-purchase of stock is not 
void at its inception; rather, it is the impainrw11t 
of capital resulting from the re-purchase payment 
which is verboten." 
In the instant case the contract was valid, it only 
lwing that the corporation could have defended on a snit 
if payments wer€' not made on the grounds that the pay-
ment would impair the capital stock, but this does not 
mean that the obligation is not a proper one. 
On Page !) of the Brief, the appellants state that at 
the time of the execution of the agreemnt, the corpora-
tion's liabilities exceeded its assets and that it was unable 
to pay its debts in the usual course of business, which 
fact was only known to the defendants and not to the 
plaintiffs. However, under the Burk case, this is imma-
terial and they have failed to show that the corporation. 
when the paymenb; became dne, was unable to pay it~ 
debts or was insolvent. 
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On Page 10, thP appellanfo quote from the case of 
HofJ<'Y r. Walton Lwnber Compa11y) 17 ·wash. 2d 242, 135 
l'.:ld 90, 145 A.L.R 924, bnt unfortunately they do not 
rnah a complete quote of the rule set forth in that case. 
There is in that case a statenwnt that one of the excep-
tions to the general rnle that the liability of the principal 
<ld.Jtor measures and limits the liability of the guarantor 
i:-; that the guarantee may stand by itself, though the 
obligation guaranteed is unenforceable, where it can fairly 
be said• that such was the intention of the parties. This 
same rule is found in A. ill. Castle & Co. v. Public Service 
U11derwritcrs) 198 Wash. 576, 89 P.2d 506. An even better 
(•ase is Backits V. Fceks) 71 vVash. 508, 129 Pac. 86 wherein 
it is said that a guaranty contract may stand by itself 
though the obligation guaranteed is invalid. The instant 
rase involves one of an absolute guarantee that the obli-
gation is not invalid under the Burk case, although it 
111ight be unenforceable. 
Another case which might be of assistance to the 
Court is Amick v. Baugh) 66 vVn. 2d 298, 402 P.2d 342. 
Jn this case there is a good discussion of what an absolute 
~uarantee is, and it falls right in line with the other 
cases. 
Again referring to the case of Robey v. Walton Lum-
lll'r Company, 17 vVash. 2d 242, 135 P.2d 95, 145 A.L.R. 
!1:!4, this case was cited by the plaintiff to the trial court 
and the instant case is an absolute guarantee and on page 
102 of the Pacific, Column 2, Paragraph 17, it states: 
11 
'• ( 17) All of tlH· authorit;; S('('lll to hold that 
wlwrP tlw guaranty is ahsolnt(•, and 1>ro\·idPs for 
th(• pa~;11wnt of a s11(•cifiPd sum or sums at fixwl 
pPriods, liability of tlH· gnanrntor lwe011H·s fiwd 
on ddault of the prineipal. \VP an' satisfied that 
th<' guaranty h('re in question is an absolute and 
unconditional one. 
In the instant case, the guarantor, by expn•ss 
words, absolutt•ly and nneonditionally guarantePd 
tlH• pay11wnt of the principal and interest of the 
bonds. The timP of 1my11wnt and the amount dur 
WN<' ddinitely fixed hy the bonds themselves an<l 
by the trust mortgage." 
Undt>r the Robey l'. lF alton Lwnber Company case 
it is an absolntr guarantee and the liability affixed as if 
it was contracted originally by the Ryttings and in fact 
that is wlwre tlw eontract was. ':L1hat the defendants do 
not allege or set out payment or that there was an agree-
11wnt after the contract was enfrred into that as payment 
of the contract tlw air conditioner "-as given to the plain-
tiff or that accounts recei\·ahle were to be given to the 
plaintiff as payment. 
POINT III 
THE TERMS OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT CANNOT BE 
VARIED BY P AROL EVIDENCE. 
'l'his is a ver>· fnndanwntal rnk•, but we wish ta 
<1uote this genPral wrll-known rnk• from 30 Am. Jur 2d, 
Sec. 101G page 149 as follows: 
''101G Gt>nerally. 
'l'he well-established gr1wral rule is that wht'l'I' 
the partiPs to a eontract luwe d1:•liherately put 
their enaao-e11H•nt in writina in sneh tN111s as i111-
b b b 
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port a legal obligation without any uncertainty 
as to the object or Pxtent of such (~ngagement, it 
is conclusively presnnwd that the entire engage-
ment of the parties, and the extent and manner of 
their undertaking, have been reduced to writing, 
and all parol evidence of prior or contemporan-
eous conversations or declarations tending to sub-
stitute a new and different contract for the one 
evidenced by the writing is incompetent. Stated 
otherwise, the intention of the parties as evidenced 
by the legal import of the language of a valid 
written contract cannot ordinarily be varied by 
parol proof of a different intention. A narrower 
statement of the rule appears in some cases to 
the effect that the parol evidence rule excludes 
only evidence of the language used by the parties 
in making the contract other than that which is 
furnished by the instrument itself. THE RULE 
IS ALSO STATED 'J10 EXCLUDE THE COL-
LOQUIUM OR ORAL NEGOTIATION LEAD-
ING TO THE VERY CONTRACT, -WHICH 
THE PARTIES CONSUMMA'l1ED BY REDUC-
ING IT TO WRITING. 
The parol evidence rule as applied to con-
tracts is simply that as a matter of substantive 
law, a certain act - that is, the act of embodying 
the complete terms of an agreement in a writing 
- becomes the contract of the parties. The rule 
comes into operation when there is a single and 
final memorial of the understanding of the par-
ties; when that takes place, prior and contempor-
aneous negotiations are excluded, or as is some-
times said, the written memorial supersedes these 
prior or contemporaneous negotiations." 
13 
1'ht>n• an• a nH1tilwr of l 'tah enRe8 in the Pacifie di-
gt'8t, all of whid1 affirm thP gpm•ral rnle alwve 8d ont, 
and thi8 eomt, 8peaking through .T HRticl~ HP1Hiod in tltl· 
caRe of Je11srn's Cscd Cars 1·. James 1'. Rice, 7 U 2d 2/(i, 
:t23 P.2d 25~), rpaffirn1s thi8 doctrine in the following 
lanJ..,'1.tage and we q note from Paragraph 3 Page 2G0-2Gl 
and the entirety of Paragraph 4: 
(3) Elenwntary it is that in con8truing con-
tracts we seek to determine the intentions of thl' 
parties. But it is also elenwntan· and of extrenH' 
practical importance that we hold contracting par-
tie8 to their cl<:'ar and underntandable language 
dPlilH_•rately committed to writing and endorsed by 
them a8 8ignatorie8 thereto. \Vere this not so 
business, one with another among our citizens, 
would be relegated to the chaotic, and the basic 
purpose of the law to supply enforceable rules of 
conduct for the maintenance and improvement of 
an orderly society's welfare and progress would 
find itsPlf impotent. * * * The rule excluding 
mattPrs outside the four corners of a clear, undPr 
Rtandable docmnent, is a fair one, and one ·8 con-
tentions concerning his intent should Pxtend no 
further than his own ck•ar expressions. 
( 4) It was urged corrt>ctly that to admit mat-
ters outside a contract would do violence to the 
principle that one is bound by hi8 manift>statiom 
of ass<mt, and that, irrespective of such conten-
tion, such matters properl>- are excludable hy tlw 
parol evidence rule, - \\-hich rule, eoumwl sug-
gP8ts, is om• of substantin' law rather than om' of 
Pvidenct>. "ThateYPr kind one calls it, the rnk 
that exclndPs surh Pvidl•nce is a common RPTI~l' 
rule. 
14 
CONCLUSION 
'V (' snbmit that there is no competent evidence men-
tiniwd in the affidavit which would require the introdnc-
ton of evi<lenc(•, and thP defendants should not bl' allowed 
to vary the terms of the \nittPn contract. 
rrhat under ·washington statuh•s and cases, a \Vash-
ington corporation may purchase its own stock and it 
i::< not void. 
'l1hat the defendants signed an absolute guarantee 
and nnder vVashington law are liable whether the cor-
poration would be liable or not. 
\Ve submit the J ndgnwnt of the trial court should be 
rnstained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GOLDEN \V.ROBBINS 
705 Newhouse Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
JOHN S. MOORE of 
Velikanje, Moore and 
Countryman 
Yakima, \V ashington 
Attorneys for the Respondent 
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EXHIBIT A 
CONDITIONAL SALJ<~ OF STOCK AUHEI~MI~NT 
'rhis Agn•('IJH'nt rnadf' and <·nt<•r('d into this :Z7th dav 
of May, 19(i(i, b.'· and lwtm'<·n HAHOLD D. HAINFOHJ), 
hl·reinaft('r rPfrrrPd to as "\' <·rnlor,'' arnl THI~ CA H-
HIAOE HOl'SE, INC., a Washington ('orporation, hen·-
inafter referred to as "Y ende('," 
\VITNESSETH: 
\VIIEREAS, Yendor is presently the owner of twen-
ty-five (25) shares of stock in THE CARRIAOE 
HOUSE, INC., a \Vashington corporation; and, 
\VHEREAS, it is the desire of thl• parties hereto to 
providP for the sale by tlw Y endor to Yend<'e of the Y Pn-
dor's inh'rest and shares of stock in said corporation, 
NO\V, THEREI~ORI~, in consideration of tlw mu-
tual eovPnants, conditions and provisions hereinafter sd 
forth and th<> payments to be made, it is hereby agTPl'(l 
by the parties hereto as follows: 
1. 
Subject to the terms and conditions of this agreemt>nt 
as set forth bl'low, Yendor does lwreby sdl and as;-;ig11, 
and Yendee does hereh.'- purchase, YPnclor's said t\\·enty-
five (25) shares of stock in said corporation, the shan·~ 
of stock being evidenced by stock el'rtificate No. 3. 
2. 
The purchasc> price for said shares of stoek is T\\"0 
THOUSAND FIYE HlT?\DRED DOLLAHS ($2,500.001. 
to lwar interPf't at the rate of six p<'revnt (Ii<;{) per am11111 1 
from thP 10th clay of A ugnst, 19GG, payable as foll<ms: 
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At the rat<' of ONI~ HUNDRED DOLLAHS ($100) 
1J('r month, ('Olllllll'llC'ing on or bdore tlH• 10th day of 
Augw..;t, l~HiG, and on or bPfon~ the• 10th da \' of each ·snc-
('('('di11g month until the• prineipal and int.Pn•st i:::; fully 
paid; provich·d, lHrn·e\ n, that the Pntin• obligation, plu:::; 
al'enwd inkrest, shall lw payable~ in full on or hefore the 
Wtl1 day of FdJrnary, 1%8. From Pach monthly pa,nnent 
tlil'n' sltall first be deductc•d inkn•st upon tlw unpaid bal-
anee of the principal indehkd1wss at the rate of six per-
l'(•nt (G)r) per annmu, and the remainder of each monthly 
installment shall be applied to the reduction of the prin-
tipal indebtedness. 
3. 
For the purpose of securing tlw obligation of V endee, 
tlH· VPndor shall retain the title and possession of said 
~lmres of :::;toek (as evidencPd by the said stock certificate) 
until full and final performance of Vl'ndee's obligation 
hPrein, and thereafter Y endor shall deliver the possession 
of the said certificate and properly endorse the same to 
tl1e V endee. 
4. 
Until this contract has been fully performed by Ven-
rlPP and satisfied by Vendor, the hooks and records of 
the emupany shall at all times show the interest of the 
\'c·ndor in the shares of ::;toek hereby ::;old to the Vendee. 
\'(•nd<'e shall have all rights to ::;aid stock, including the 
right to vote ::;aid ::;tock and recPive dividends thereon; 
provided, however, that Vernke ::;hall have no right to 
tnm::;fer, sell, mortgage, pledgP, Pncmnber or otherwise 
di~pose of said stock or any of the rights or obligations 
llll'.iclent to the ownership in any manner until full satis-
J'aetion of this contract. 
5. 
Time is of thl' e::;::;pncP of thi~ contract, and if Vendee 
Jails or nPglPcts to comply ~with any of the terms, cov-
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enants or conditions of this eontrad, lw<·o111Ps insolnn!, 
makes an assigm1wnt for th1• lH•1wfit o!' en·ditors, or i~ 
a<lju<licat<'d a bankrupt, or if a n•e<>iv<·r is appoint<>d 111 
a<lrninist<'r th<• affairs of Y<·rnh•1•, th<'n Y<>ndor i->hall ha\"1· 
t}w right and option to (a) tPn11inat<' thi8 eontraet and 
imm<'<liately re-a8sert ahsolntl> O\\'nl'rnhip of the sto('k 
sold hen•hy, rdaining all rnoni<'8 tlH•r<>for paid 011 thi~ 
contract by Y t•nd<'<' as liquidated damag<·s for tlw non-
fulfillnH·nt of this eontract, ancl the use and depreciation 
of tlw }H'O]JL>rty interPst for which said stock is <~vidL'nr(·, 
and tlwreupon all right and int<•rest of the Yen<lee in thP 
stock lH·rPb~- sold shall l'<'HS<' and tl>nninate; or (b) to 
declare the entin~ n•maining balance dne hen'lmder forth-
with due and payablr and bring 8Uit and recover judg--
ment thPrefor, togethC'r with a reasonable sum as attor-
neys' fees. 
6. 
It is agreed and undNstood that any action at law 
or Pquity arising out of this contract betwePn the partiPs 
herdo 8hall lie in the Sn1wrior Court of the State of 
'Vashington in and for Yakima County. In the fnrtlwr 
event of litigation between the parti<•s lwreto relatin).[ 
to tlw rights or duties ari8ing out of this rontrad, th1· 
}H'evailing party in such litigation shall hC' rntitkd to 
recover attorm·ys' foes in addition to costs taxable hy 
law, the amount thereof to be fixed by the court. 
7. 
ThC'rr are no conditions or provisions of this agTl't'-
ment bebn•Pn tlw parties lwrdo rplating to th<> suhjed 
matter of this contract whieh are not contairn•d h1·rPin. 
nor rl'pres<'ntations nor warrantit•s not l'XprPi->8ly eou-
tained hC'rPin. This contrart contains the Pntire aµ.Tc1· 
ment lwtwC'L'n the parties hereto. 
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s. 
Xo wain·r hy Y<'ndor of an~· <ld'anlt, d<>lay or breach 
hy \'cndee shall OJH'rat<' as \Yain•r of any ::mbsequent 
dd'anlt, delay or brPach by \\•ndet'. 
9. 
rrhis eontract shall be binding npon and cnure to 
the: benefit of tlw parties herc~to, their lwirs, m;signs, 1wr-
~011al rq>resentatives and succ<'ssors; providt>d, however, 
that Y<'ndee shall not assign, transfer or in any way 
attempt to dispose of the stock sold, nor of V endee's 
rights nnder this contract without prior written consent 
o[ Y t•ndor. Any such att<•mpted assignment, transfer or 
disposal without the consent of Vendor shall be void. 
IN wrrNESS 'VHEREOF, the parties hereto have 
1H·rc1mto set their hands the day and year first above 
written. 
/s/ Harold D. Rainford 
Vendor 
THE CARRIAGE HOUSE, 
INC., Vendee 
By Suzanne H. Rytting /s/ 
President 
L'nclersigned hen·by personally guarantee full payment 
allcl performance of the above conditional sales contract 
by The Carriage House, Inc. 
/s/ vVm. R. Rytting 
/s/ Suzanne H. Rytting 
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